Introduction
The Coase Theorem 1 , as it is well known, asserts that in absence of transaction costs, the …nal outcome of bargaining (i.e., the resource allocation among individuals) does not depend on the initial distribution of rights or liability rules 2 . As noted about a decade ago by Usher (1998) , e¢ ciency may be achieved not only with a well de…ned assignment of initial property rights (or liability rules), but also in situations in which property rights are insecure and/or ill-de…ned.
This aspect of the Coase theorem is full analyzed -among others -in Schmitz (2001) , and more recently by Robson-Skaperdas (2008) 3 . In this work, we explore the robustness of the Coase theorem with respect to the …nal distribution of property rights which constitutes, as far as we know, a less cultivated …eld of research.
The analysis is made in a non-cooperative game setting. Indeed, we follow an important branch of literature 4 according to which individual rights may be represented in a non-cooperative game. That is, we associate to each assignment of individual rights a set of permissible strategies that individuals can play. More precisely, in our framework, each assignment of property rights is associated to a non-cooperative game in pure strategies.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume the existence of two di¤erent right regimes to which correspond two di¤erent non-cooperative games 5 . Under this two-games framework, we explore the possibility that individual rights (or liability rules) are alienable. In other terms, we consider situations in which the assignment of property rights is exchangeable, by assuming the possibility of switching from a certain game to another one.
We will see that in our framework, in order to reach e¢ ciency, agents have to stipulate binding contracts. In the analysis we distinguish between permanent and temporary contracts showing (section 4) the di¤erence of the two kinds of contracts with respect to the …nal attribution of individual rights. More precisely, we will show that, with temporary contracts and under particular assumptions, the right regime switch may be endless. Section 4 also shows the necessary conditions on individual preferences in order to obtain such result.
An other result of the paper (section 4) is that our …ndings are robust with respect to the introduction of side payments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we brie ‡y describe the way in which rights are introduced in economic analysis. In section 3, we set the economic environment. In section 4, we present the results of the paper. Finally, section 5 concludes.
Rights in economic theory
As it is well known, individual rights play an important role in the Coase theorem. As far as we know, the …rst author who introduced rights in economics -at least in a formal way -was Amartya Sen with his famous liberal paradox (Sen, 1970 ). Sen's notion of rights was articulated by attributing to each individual the decisiveness over one pair of social states di¤erent among them for a feature concerning the individual himself. This idea is quite simple and intuitive: being these alternatives di¤erent only for personal characteristics which refers to the single individual, the individual himself is entitled to …x the social ranking of these two alternatives. This …rst approach was based on the existence of some social choice rule which was asked to satisfy individual rights, the Pareto principle and an universal domain assumption on individual preferences. Rights are a sort of constraint that the social choice rule should satisfy. Sen (1970) shows that such social choice rule does not exist. Always by referring to a social choice rule, a somewhat more articulated notion of rights was subsequently introduced by Gibbard in an in ‡uential paper (Gibbard, 1974) 6 . Another, and more recent, stream of literature interprets rights in terms of game forms. The basic idea, in this case, is that rights attribute to the individual the entitlement of choosing within a set of permissible strategies. Once rights are established, and consequently the sets of individual admissible strategies, agents exercise their rights by playing the non-cooperative game in pure strategies 7 . In this paper, in order to analyze the Coase theorem, we will use the game form representation of rights 8 . We will assume that by choosing his strategy, the agent is able to …x a 'feature'of the social state and thus he is able to in ‡uence the …nal outcome 9 . As it is well-known, in the Coase theorem an important ingredient is the initial assignment of rights or liability rules (e.g. the right to pollute, to make noise, etc.). In our work, to each initial assignment of rights it corresponds a non-cooperative game with di¤erent strategies. For example, to the right to pollute for a …rm it corresponds a set of available strategies (say game A) that are di¤erent in the event the …rm has no right to pollute (say game B). At the same time, the other …rm damaged from pollution has di¤erent strategies according to the initial assignment of pollution right (game A and B).
Furthermore, we explore the possibility that rights are alienable. In other terms, we consider situations in witch the assignment of individual rights (liability rules) are exchangeable. The agents may 'bargain'among them by switching from a certain assignment of individual rights to another, that is by switching from a game to another 10 . 6 This literature is partially surveyed, among others, by Sen himself (1976) , Suzumura (1983) and Wriglesworth (1985) .
7 This is, roughly speaking, the essence of game form articulation of individual rights. See, among others Gaertner, Pattanaik and Suzumura (1992) . Sen (1992) [contains] a rejoinder to the game form articulation of individual rights. 8 In other terms, within a particular game, we assume that agents may exercise their rights by choosing a strategy among their set of available strategies. 9 We remind the reader that this assumption is not generally true in the realm of game form articulation of individual rights. A di¤erent notion refers to concept of 'e¤ectivity function' (see, among others, Peleg 1998) .
1 0 Since we analyze the Coase theorem, a standard assumption we make is that e¢ ciency is the implicit goal of individuals. If, on the contrary, rights concern purely private matters, such as in Sen's Liberal Paradox, then it is questionable that social e¢ ciency represents still a desideratum. See, e.g., Sen (1983 Sen ( , 1995 Suzumura (1996) .
The economic environment
Let N = f1; 2g be the set of economic actors 11 with generic element i = 1; 2. Each actor has a set of strategies that depend on the liability or responsibility rules (i.e., the right to emit pollution, to make noise, and so on). For simplicity we consider two di¤erent attributions of individual rights, that we label by h 2 fA; Bg. Each right attribution o¤ers di¤erent possibilities of actions to economic agents: in particular, we suppose that it is possible to associate to each right attribution rule a set of strategies to the individuals. We associate to the generic right regime h the set of strategies
h 2 g, where, for simplicity,
Given the initial attribution of rights (and thus of strategies), agents play a non-cooperative game in pure strategies.
Furthermore, we introduce a payo¤ function u which maps the combination of individual strategies
2 into the set of individual payo¤s u :
The payo¤ of each individual is therefore a function of the emerging couple of strategy in the game,
where s is the generic strategy played by agent i in game (right regime) h, while t is the generic strategy played by the other agent, say i, in the same game.
In our framework, a bargain is de…ned as a decision among individuals which "exchanges" (transfers) their rigths or liability rules. This decision will a¤ect the individual set of strategies (the environment) and therefore their way to operate.
In our setting, an exchange of individual rights is a "switch" from right regime A (resp. B) to B (resp. A). In the following we will call the result of the bargain process a switch right regime (SRR).
We have now the basic ingredients that we will use to show our results.
Results
The results we prove in this section are based on six assumptions and two de…nitions that we present and discuss:
Assumption 1. Given a right attribution, agents have the possibility to switch to the other one.
Assumption 2. There are no transaction costs.
Assumption 3. There are no side payments.
1 1 Dixit and Olson (2000) show the non-validity of the Coase theorem when the number of actors is su¢ ciently high, because of free-riding behavior.
Assumption 4. In absence of binding contracts, given a right attribution h 2 fA; Bg, each agent acts according to individual rationality, that is by choosing (whether exists) his/her dominant strategy.
Assumption 5. The game may be played for an inde…nite number of times. Agents discount future payo¤s at rate > 0.
Assumption 1 relies on the literature interpreting individual right as a noncooperative game (see section 2). Accordingly, a change of individual rights implies a change of the game played.
Assumption 2 is standard in the Coase theorem literature. The issue whether the presence of transaction costs a¤ects the robustness of Coase theorem was analyzed, among others, by Felli (2001, 2006 De…nition 2. With a temporary binding contract agents may switch right regime and are obliged to play the strategy they have stipulated for a …nite number of moves.
Assumption 6. Temporary binding contract obliges agents only for a single move and can be stipulated more than one time.
As far as we know, in the literature, temporary binding contract is a less cultivated …eld: The issue of contract duration has been mainly analyzed, in contract theory, with reference to relationship-speci…c investment (Joskow, 1987) .
Regarding the robustness of the Coase theorem, in this paper when we say that it does not hold, we refer to the fact that agents are no able to attain the most e¢ cient outcome.
We are now ready to state the main result of the paper.
Proposition 1
Given N = f1; 2g and given two di¤erent attributions of individual rights, A and B, there exists a payo¤ function u : (1, 5) (7, 3) ) with an associated payo¤ higher for everyone (7, 3).
According to Assumption 1, agents may switch to game B without any transaction cost (Assumption 2). However, if there are no binding contracts, given Assumption 4 agent 1 knows that after the switch, agent 2 will play his/her dominant strategy B 21 . Therefore, 1's payo¤ will be 2 which is lower than his/her actual payo¤ (4). Further, given Assumption 3, agents are not able to reach the outcome (3,7), since there are no side payments. This prove part (i) of Proposition 1.
If there are permanent binding contracts, according to Assumption 1, agents may switch to game B without any transaction cost (Assumption 2). Further, thanks to binding contracts they are able to oblige themselves in playing forever the strategies ( If there are temporary binding contracts, by Assumptions 1 and 2, agents may switch to game B without any transaction cost. If they stipulate a temporary binding contract they will earn initially a payo¤ (7, 3). Then, after this single move, by Assumption 4, they will end up in the Nash equilibrium of game B with a new payo¤ (2,4). However this situation is harmful for agent 1 who would lose 5. Therefore in order to reduce such loss, agent 1 will propose a new temporary binding contract in order to switch in game A in ( A 12 ;
A 22 ) which assures to each player a higher payo¤ (7, 3) with respect to the Nash equilibrium in B. However we note that (
is not a Nash equilibrium and, therefore, according to our previous reasoning they will switch to ( B 12 ; B 22 ), and so on. We note also that is rational for each agent to prefer this "continuous switch" to the initial Nash equilibrium. Indeed, without stipulating contracts, agent 1 would earn the following discounted payo¤
which is lower (for every > 0) than the discounted payo¤ agent 1 would earn with temporary binding contracts:
It can be easily checked that the same holds also for agent 2. This proves the second part of (iii).
In order to prove the …rst part of (iii), i.e. the fact that the Coase theorem holds with temporary binding contracts, we note that with temporary binding contracts agents will shift "continuously" from a payo¤ (3, 7) to a payo¤ (7, 3) which are, both of them, e¢ cient payo¤s. k
Individual preferences
Probably the …rst reaction to Proposition 1 is to say that it is not generally true: more precisely, with temporary binding contracts we have a 'continuous' switch of property rights because of the particular values of individual payo¤s. This consideration is obviously correct: our result is not generally true but holds only in some circumstances. In particular we showed in the proof of the proposition that the "trick" by which we obtained this switch depends on the fact that there is an outcome in game A such that everyone prefers it to the Nash equilibrium of game B and, symmetrically, there exists an outcome in B such that every agent prefers it to the Nash equilibrium in game A. We can show that a necessary condition on individual preferences in order to have a no stable allocation of …nal rights under temporary binding contracts is that there are at least two externalities/spillovers one for each game and one for each agent. In other terms, it has to exist an agent i having an externality/spillover in right regime A and the other agent ( i) having an externality/spillover in right regime B.
In order to show this result, we state the following de…nition: De…nition 3. We say that an agent i has no externalities/spillovers in game
This implies that for agent i there are no externalities if his payo¤ is not altered by the decision of the other agent, and therefore, i may neglect the decisions of the other agent.
Proposition 2
Given N = f1; 2g and given two di¤erent attributions of individual rights, A and B, under assumptions A1-A6, a necessary condition in order to have a no stable allocation of …nal rights in presence of temporary binding contracts is that player i has an externality/spillover in game A and player ( i) has an externality/spillover in game B.
Proof:
For notational convenience, the Nash equilibrium in game h will be denoted by N E h . In order to have a no convergent allocation of …nal rights, it is necessary that there is a combination of strategies in game A, that we denote (a) with a little abuse of notation 13 , such that:
and a combination of strategies in B, say (b), such that:
Now assume, by contradiction, that i has has no externalities. The absence of externalities for i implies that there is no combination of strategies which assures to him a higher payo¤ than the Nash equilibrium, i.e
i (a) which contradicts equation (1). Therefore i has at least one externality (the same arguments also holds for i).
In order to show that both externalities have to lie in di¤erent games, suppose, by contradiction, that they both are in the same game, without loss of generality, game B. Now, if in game A there are no externalities, then we have l (N E A ) l (a) 8l 2 N , which implies, by equations (1) and (2),
However in this case we haven't got an endless switch, since individuals will always have interest to choose b. Indeed, assume that for some reason they are in game B. They have no incentive to exchange their rights and to switch to game A, since b is the best result for all. On the other hand, if they are in game A, they will have an incentive to switch in B and, through a binding contract, to choose b. k
In order to have a better understanding of Proposition 2, we present the following numerical example.
Example 1. Let's consider the following payo¤s in Game A and B.
1 3 In other terms, in order to simplify the notation in the proof, we replace i ( h is ; h it ) with i (a). (1, 4) (2, 3) Table 4 : Matrix payo¤s in right regime B.
It can be easily checked that game A exhibits a Nash equilibrium with an associated payo¤ (4, 2) that game B exhibits a (pure strategies) Nash equilibrium with an associated payo¤ (2, 4), that there an outcome in A such that everyone prefers it to the Nash equilibrium in B (and simmetrically in B ), and that agent 1 in game A has not any externality and so agent 2 in game B.
Side payments
In this section, we relax Assumption 3 and we analyze situations in which side payments are allowed. One could argue that the introduction of side payments may be su¢ cient to avoid the "non-convergence"of …nal rights. In other words, it could be argued that with side payments, individuals would not have the necessity to switch from a right regime to another, but simply may …nd a proper amount of payo¤ transfers such that the e¢ cient outcome (which is not a Nash equilibrium of the game without side payments) may become the new Nash equilibrium of the game. In this section, we show that the introduction of side payments cannot be considered a satisfactory solution to the problem of attribution of …nal rights. In other terms, in what follows Assumption 3* replaces Assumption 3.
Assumption 3*. Side-payments are allowed.
Given Assumption 3*, we may state the following result.
Proposition 3 Given N = f1; 2g, and two di¤erent attributions of individual rights, A and B, and given Assumptions 2 and 3* then there exists a payo¤ function u :
2 g, such that the Coase theorem does not hold, i.e. individuals are not able to reach the e¢ cient outcome.
Proof:
Suppose the payo¤s the players receive in A and B are the following: In order to show the result and to avoid the introduction of further notation, it is su¢ cient, for our purposes, to follow strictly Jackson-Wilkie (2005 
1)
14 . Let's consider, without loss of generality, game A (same argumentation holds for game B ): it can be easily checked that game A has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies with the associated payo¤ (4, 2). In order to reach the outcome with the greater total payo¤ (3, 7), agent 2 has the incentive to o¤er a payment of 5 + " to agent 1 contingent on the agent 1 playing A 11 . Now the situation becomes:
(8, 1.5) (4, 2) Table 7 : Matrix payo¤s in right regime A.
At this point, in order to avoid that agents 2 deviates, agent 1 has the interest to o¤er any payment of at least 1+" to agent 2 contingent on the agent 2 playing A 21 . The matrix payo¤s now becomes: Now, it can be easily seen that ( A 11 , A 21 ) is the new Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and it also the e¢ cient outcome.
However, we have to note that if agent 2 o¤ers any payments of at least 5 + " to agent 1 contingent on the agent 1 playing A 11 , it is not interest of agent 1 to o¤er 1 + " to agent 2 contingent on the agent 2 playing With these associated side payments, game A has a new Nash equilibrium in pure strategies ( A 12 , A 21 ) which assures to agent 1 a greater payo¤, and which is not the most e¢ cient outcome, since the total payo¤ is lower than ( A 11 , A 21 ).k The reason for which side payments cannot be considered a general solution to reach the e¢ cient outcome is clearly identi…ed by Jackson and Wilkie (2005, p. 546) : "Players can use transfers to try to ensure that the other players internalize externalities. However, they can also use transfers to try to manipulate A A 21 A 22 A 11 (7, 3) (5+", 3-")
A 12
(7-", 2.5+") (4, 2) A 12 (7.5-", 2+") (4, 2) Table 9 : Matrix payo¤s in right regime A.
other players' behaviour more generally. Sometimes, these objectives are at odds with each other, and then it is impossible to support e¢ cient outcomes in equilibrium."
Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze the robustness of the Coase theorem in a non-cooperative game framework, and in cases in which it is possible to exchange the conferment of individual rights (or liability rules).
